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Introduction
Professional sports are a critical and universally loved part of America’s ethos. Millions
of fans from across the country flock every year to sports stadiums, hoping to see their favorite
player in action or just to enjoy the ambiance of the ballgame. Every Sunday during fall and
winter, 60,000 fans attend prodigious NFL complexes, whereas 20,000 or so fans frequent an
MLB stadium for 162-game schedule. When fans visit these stadiums, they often will pay for a
soda, a hot dog and maybe even a jersey. But there is another, more surreptitious payment they
make, unbeknownst to almost everyone who attends: the actual stadium itself. Once an entirely
private undertaking, public funding for stadiums has increased substantially since the 1950’s. In
recent years, public subsidization has grown so much that taxpayers have contributed nearly $1
billion to several stadiums (Farren & Philpot, 2019; Bagli, 2018).
Public funding for sports stadiums has correlated with the increase of sports teams’
valuations, granting team owners significant negotiation leverage with politicians. Many owners
express their need for a new stadium using public dollars, citing their outdated facility, a poor
location or to catalyze economic development for their host city. If cities refuse to shell over
taxpayer dollars, teams have threatened to leave their home and relocate to an area which would
be willing to accommodate them financially. Some teams, such as the Oakland Raiders, have left
a fanbase of passionate fans behind in order to obtain a new stadium. When teams were worth
only a few million dollars 50 years ago, governments had little incentive to ensure the team
remained in their jurisdiction; however, now that these assets are worth billions of dollars,
politicians either feel pressure or sense opportunity to maintain or lure a team to their city.
Losing a sports team is certainly a huge blow to cities and fans alike, but a large amount of
economic literature suggests that building a new stadium for the sake of recruiting a team is a
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poor economic investment. This literature has existed for decades, and yet politicians continue to
allocate public funding for stadiums, either to entice teams to relocate or to prevent their team
from leaving.
This thesis analyzes the economic and political implications of stadium construction, and
the many moving parts of the problem. The thesis dives deep into two case studies of recent
stadium constructions in Las Vegas and New York, looking at the considerations of each stadium
and how decision makers were able to build these stadiums. From overreported economic
benefits to neighborhood revitalization, the promises made by stadium proponents simply never
live up to the lofty expectations set. In the thesis, I explain how these processes continually play
out, embarking on an extensive literature review of the many contributory aspects of stadium
construction. I then explain the theoretical framework of the issue, using economic analyses such
as the contingent valuation method (CVM) and the political theory of authors like James Q.
Wilson to uncover the issue. There are various political and economic concepts that make up the
dynamics of stadium construction, so this section also creates a baseline as I transition into two
case studies.
The Yankees and Raiders case studies serve to take this theoretical discussion and
manifest it in a practical way, explaining how these processes play out. I choose the Yankees and
Raiders cases studies for two reasons. The first is that both are relatively new projects that have
limited analyses, so these case studies help update the current literature of stadium construction.
The second is that these case studies, while two of the most expensive in history, are quite
representative of general themes in this literature. The Raiders case study lays out the general
processes of stadium construction, serving as a template for the ensuing Yankees case study. The
Yankees case study also discusses general themes but delves deeper into how politicians
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negotiate with owners to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. My analyses help to uncover the
political and economic processes that take place in the Yankees and Raiders studies, and to take
these analyses to uncover the larger picture of stadium construction. After, I delve into a
discussion, which summarizes the commonalities of stadium construction domestically and
internationally and extends the discussion to other areas of interest.
Public funding for stadium construction is a widely researched topic, but this thesis
serves to branch out from existing literature by integrating a political science perspective to a
problem typically defined as economic. Team owners may be outspoken about their new
stadiums or fans may learn about the plans on Twitter, but political maneuverings are a seldom
discussed aspect of the equation. It is difficult to rationalize why politicians would continue to
fund stadiums when many are aware that doing so directly harms their constituents, but my thesis
illustrates that there are clear reasons why politicians do so. Looking at this problem from a
strictly economic lens cannot fully explain the issue, as publicly funded stadium construction
continues despite overwhelming evidence of the economic detriments. At the core of this issue is
a complex political calculus, with politicians, interest groups and owners all working together to
create a brand-new stadium. And while these parties collaborate to construct the stadium, one
key group is left out of the considerations: the taxpayer.
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Literature Review
This chapter examines three distinct strands of the vast literature review on stadium
construction. The first section includes a general overview of the processes and costs stadium
construction itself. The second section covers the tangible benefits promised by stadium
proponents, and how these promises often do not come to fruition. The third section discusses
the intangible benefits of stadium construction and examines the extent to which these benefits
justify the large public subsidies allocated to sports teams.

Part 1: General Overview of Stadium Construction:
Public funding for stadiums is an issue of public policy interest. Professional sports
leagues are private enterprises that answer to small groups of affluent owners. Teams yield
sizeable monopoly power over their home cities, permitting them to extract millions of taxpayer
dollars in local subsidies through tax-exempt municipal bonds (Drukker et al., 2020). Despite
substantial evidence to the contrary, subsidy proponents continue to claim that professional
sports increase local income, wages, employment, and tax revenues (Rosentraub, 2014). Major
sports leagues are highly profitable – the average National Basketball Association (NBA) team
has an average valuation of $2.12 billion and the average Major League Baseball (MLB)
franchise is worth $1.85 billion – but most of the profit is not reinvested in local economies or
communities. In fact, local and state politicians often raise taxes to lure or maintain teams in their
district, as constituents are often not aware of the lack of economic benefits and have taken little
action on the issue (Delaney & Eckstein, 2003).
As the four major sports leagues in the United States – the NBA, NHL, MLB and NFL –
are all structurally monopolistic, team owners gain leverage over city and state governments
(Safir, 1997). Sports leagues have roughly 30 teams, with expansion strictly limited so teams do
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not compete over media markets. The fixed supply of sports teams – cities can only gain a team
if another were to lose one – creates a dynamic in which owners have significant leeway to
relocate if they receive a tempting offer (Safir, 1997). Baseball operates under an exemption to
the Sherman Act and maintains geographic stability by requiring unanimous approval of team
owners before a team can move; however, the other leagues have full jurisdiction on where they
would like to house their franchise (Keating, 1997). The perpetual threat of relocation often
forces city and local governments to overpay to keep their team, with funding coming from the
taxpayer rather than the team itself (Humphreys, 2018).
The leverage gained by sports owners due to excess demand for sports teams allows
opportunities for owners to extract revenues. Not all sports franchises take advantage of taxpayer
funding; for example, the Charlotte Panthers and San Francisco Giants have built new stadiums
with modest public costs of site acquisition and infrastructural investments (Zimbalist & Noll,
1997). Some stadiums, such as the new $5 billion SoFi Stadium for the Los Angeles Rams and
Chargers, was entirely privately funded by ownership and a $200 million G4 loan from the NFL
(Fenno & Farmer, 2020). But in most cases, local and state governments have paid over $100
million in stadium subsidies, and in some cases have funded the entire expenditure. (Edelman,
2009). If a host city refuses to build its team a new stadium, the team’s owners can make a
credible threat to move cities, depriving the non-subsidizing city any access to premier,
professional baseball (Quirk & Fort, 2000). Expanding into new markets would have allowed
existing MLB owners to accrue lucrative franchise fees from new ownership groups and revenue
sharing models, but not expanding actually proved to be more profitable (Josza & Guthrie,
1999). Non-expansion of sports leagues allows owners to maintain a position of power, as they
consistently resort to relocation plans unless their host city funds their expenses.
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Through various loopholes and clever tax maneuvers by local governments, taxpayers
heavily contribute to funding new sports stadiums. Public subsidies amounted to $177 million
per facility while more than $6 billion in public funds were spent on stadium and arena
construction in the 1990’s (Long, 2005; Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001). Despite a few
exceptions, stadiums were entirely privately financed until the early 1950’s. In 1951, MLB
Commissioner Ford Frick announced that cities must subsidize construction of new stadiums, as
teams were struggling to cover the costs of stadium construction while accruing a profit (Fort,
2011). Milwaukee County Stadium was the first public-funded stadium built to attract another
franchise, as Milwaukee representatives believed that investing in a new facility would both lure
a professional team and bring economic development. When the Boston Braves moved to
Milwaukee, policymakers realized that building a new facility could attract sports teams, opening
the floodgates for cities to use public funding as a means to improve their proposal (Alakshendra,
2016).
After the Milwaukee precedent in the 1950s, owners convinced municipalities to provide
public financing, arguing that a brand-new stadium would introduce economic prosperity into the
region. To build Raymond James Stadium, the home of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and a
stadium paid for entirely by taxpayers, Hillsborough County imposed a half-cent sales tax
(Corder, 1998). Governor Pawlenty of Minnesota refused to increase gas taxes to fund state
infrastructure but raised the sales tax to fund the new Minnesota Twins stadium. Other wellknown stadiums that were entirely funded by taxpayer money include: The FedEx Forum, Time
Warner Cable Arena and the Ford Center (Komisarchik & Fenn, 2016).
Owners may have needed public subsidization to keep their teams afloat in 1950, but the
rapidly increasing valuation of sports teams shows that is not the case anymore. The Cowboys
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were bought for $8.8 million in 1973 and are now worth $5.7 billion (Gough, 2020). Adjusted
for inflation, that figure is 18 times greater than the original investment. Affluent owners and
sports teams understand that they do not need public funding anymore, yet they benefit from the
monopolistic structure in place to extract huge amounts regardless.
The search for a new stadium has also been intensified by new technology and its huge
potential for profit. Multipurpose, ordinary stadiums that were common in the early 20th century
gave way to elaborate, single-sport facilities (Zimbalist & Noll, 1997). These new stadiums
feature numerous new revenue-generating opportunities, including elaborate concessions,
catering, advertising, and even restaurants and bars that have full views of the field itself
(Hartell, 1998). The most lucrative inventions, however, are luxury boxes. Al Davis, the former
owner of the Oakland Raiders, moved stadiums entirely because the Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum refused to construct more luxury boxes. For football games, luxury box tickets can be
worth $15,000-25,000 per game, creating huge margin for owners (Kane, 2012). Additionally, a
new facility adds millions of dollars annually to a team’s revenues for a few years after the
stadium opens, as well as removing the variability in team revenues associated with a dilapidated
stadium (Rascher et al, 2012). Teams try to reduce uncertainty as much as possible, since a
team’s actual performance varies from year to year. A new stadium introduces a layer of stability
for owners – increased ticket prices and features such as luxury boxes are steady streams of
revenue – so regardless of how well the team is playing, owners are reassured that they will still
profit.
A common vehicle for the financing of major league stadiums is the private use of taxexempt bonds, as these bonds expedite the construction process and are cheaper for owners
(Goodman, 2002). Team owners want to finance the tax-exempt bonds that the city and state
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would guarantee because the costs of construction are lower with reduced interest rates on these
bonds. In the last three decades, tax-exempt bonds have raised $17 billion to facilitate
construction of stadiums across the nation. According to a 2012 study, tax exemption alone on
municipal bonds issued for sports infrastructure cost $146 million a year and taxpayers’ subsidy
to bond holders would be about $4 billion at the maturity of all the bonds issued since 1986
(Kuriloff & Preston, 2012). Today, the proportion of public funding to build professional sports
stadiums is greater than private contribution (Alakshendra, 2016).
Large local subsidies often receive the bulk of media attention, yet almost no attention is
paid to federal subsidies implicit in every tax-exempt municipal bond dedicated to stadiums. Lost
tax revenue from tax-exempt bonds is not part of the computation of federal spending and,
therefore, is not included in the federal budget (Drukker et al., 2020). This arrangement reduces
the transparency of the federal allocation of resources to these projects. Since the federal
government has limited control of the tax subsidy, the amount of the tax expenditure is not
decided through the annual appropriations procedure (Drukker et al., 2020). In effect, stadium
funding is a form of entitlement spending, whose amount is mostly specified by circumstances
outside of the federal government’s control (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). Additionally,
because tax exemption lowers interest on debt and reduces the amount cities and teams must pay
for stadiums, tax-exempt bonds are an inefficient form of subsidy (Zimbalist & Noll, 1997). The
loss of federal tax revenue exceeds the reduction in the bond issuers’ interest costs; stadiums
such as the Meadowlands in New Jersey and the Superdome in New Orleans cause an annual
federal tax loss surpassing $1 million (Zimbalist & Noll, 1997). Taxpayers from a small
neighborhood in rural Illinois may be funding a stadium in Boston, despite the likelihood of them
not stepping foot in the stadium or even being aware of its existence.
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Congressional hearings have addressed this issue for decades, but the needle has not
moved toward change. Hearings date back to the mid 1960s, in which the 88th Congress debated
the construction of the District of Columbia Stadium and allegations of misconduct. Thirteen
years later, the Senate considered the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act, in which
members of Congress sounded off on the inequities of taxpayer subsidization of stadiums.
Senator Arlen Specter labelled the practice “legalized extortion,” and while many Senators and
witnesses outlined the problems with stadium financing, the bill never made it to the House of
Representatives.
The 2007 hearing titled “Professional Sports Stadiums: Do They Divert Public Funds
From Critical Public Infrastructure?” addressed the troubling allocation of taxpayer funds.
Representatives pointed out that the Minnesota Twins received public funding for their new
stadium just a year before the I-35 West bridge collapsed, the Yankees built a new stadium worth
over $1 billion despite 50 structural bridges in the city and several Cleveland teams received new
stadiums while dangerous bridges remained operational. Members of Congress also pointed to
the increasing value of sports franchises when they obtain a new stadium; the Detroit Lions and
Tigers increased in value from $83 million to $290 million and $150 million to $839 million,
respectively. President George W. Bush spent $600,000 to buy a small stake in the Texas
Rangers, and after he and Rangers’ co-owners persuaded voters to fund a new stadium, he sold
his stake for a profit of $14.9 million.
While luxuries such as professional sports stadiums are subsidized, funding required for
critical infrastructure needs are neglected and underfunded. Studies show that neglect, not age, is
the root cause of most infrastructure failures in America. Deferring maintenance to spend in
other areas is a handy expedient for public officials faced with problems in balancing their
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budgets (Regan, 1988). Regan writes that politicians like to get credit for what they do, and the
credit is more noteworthy when you can cut the ribbon at the opening of a new facility.
Infrastructure improvements are essential for one’s well-being, but constituents and the media
are not interested in bridge maintenance (Grix et al, 2017).
Legislation aiming to curb excessive funding to stadiums has also made its way through
Congress, but it has either missed the mark or made things worse. With the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Congress attempted to eliminate tax exemptions for bonds by removing them from the
category of private activity bonds exempt from federal taxation (Drukker et al., 2020). Intended
to limit the public financing of stadiums, the Act effectively placed responsibility on state and
local governments to finance the bulk of the stadium if they wanted to receive a federal subsidy.
Congress thought that provisions included to increase public funding of stadiums would anger
constituents and reduce funding to these centers, but they erred (Kunst, 2017). The estimation
was faulty due to the combination of professional sports leagues’ monopoly power that maintains
excess demand for franchises, as well as stadium proponents’ use of pseudo-economic studies
showing that stadiums pay for themselves (Zimmerman, 2007).

Part 2: Economic Literature on Tangible Benefits
In various studies spanning decades and covering different sports leagues, economic
analysis yields the same result: sports teams and their stadiums do not stimulate the economy and
can even have a net negative effect (Zimbalist & Noll, 2000, Safir, 1997). In theory, a stadium
can spur economic growth if sports are a significant export industry, meaning it attracts nonresidents to buy the local product. If sports teams result in the sale of certain rights to national
firms, such as product licensing or broadcasting, stadiums would be profitable and benefit local
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communities (Zimbalist & Noll, 2000). In reality, sports have very little effect on regional net
exports, and rarely attracts tourists or new industries. Out of a detailed analysis of over twenty
stadiums, Zimbalist & Noll concluded that professional sports have very little economic impact,
with another study comparing the benefit to a mid-sized department store (Zimbalist & Noll,
2000; Wolla, 2017).
Studies designed to persuade cities and constituents to sponsor new stadiums grossly
overestimate the revenue sports teams bring in and neglect the opportunity cost stadiums incur.
Humphreys (2019) found that the concentration of economic activity in and around facilities on
game day represents displacement of existing consumer spending. The money spent at games
comes primarily from local residents and likely would have been spent elsewhere in the area
absent a professional team. The majority of economic activity at stadiums takes place during a
roughly three-hour period at select times of the year, whereas busy retail facilities or shopping
malls are open for hours nearly every day. While the frenetic pace of a game and the sheer
number of resources provided at a new stadium may trick consumers into thinking the stadium
catalyzes economic progress, research demonstrates that consumers fail to understand their
economic impact (Trumpbour, 2007). Across the major sports leagues, studies show that stadium
proponents overstated economic benefits by 236%, primarily because the reduced spending on
other activities that enables people to attend stadium events was not netted against stadium
spending (Zimmerman, 1996).
On average, a stadium generates $145 million per year, but very little of the revenue goes
back into the community (Vegesna, 2019). Zimmerman (1996) found that a new stadium had no
discernable impact in 27 of 30 metropolitan areas and had a negative impact in the other three.
Coates and Humphreys (2008) found no evidence that the opening of a new stadium in the NFL,
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NBA, NHL or MLB was associated with any increase in local income per capita over the period
1969 to 1994. For instance, The Oakland Raiders (now the Las Vegas Raiders) and Golden State
Warriors’ value has skyrocketed fivefold in the last few decades, but Oakland’s roads are rated
towards the bottom of the country and the Oakland Unified School District cut 340 jobs during
the 2019-2020 school year (Paulas, 2018). Subsidy proponents argue that teams’ increased
valuations and their subsequent economic effect will uplift communities; the above economic
indicators show that both teams did not help Oakland. Not only did the teams not uplift the
community, but they jetted to new locations in 2019 because of financial incentives. Yet, in
March 2020, Oakland Athletics President Dave Kaval stated the need for a new stadium, citing
significant economic benefits from their games and the increase of employment that would
follow.
Increased employment from a new stadium is a common talking point of politicians and
owners alike, but the cost to create stadium jobs are enormous compared with other industries.
Maryland’s $177 million investment to create Camden Yards Stadium – the home of the
Baltimore Orioles – netted 1,394 jobs, for an average cost of $127,000 per job (Zimmerman,
1996). Other economic development programs in the state, such as the $32.5 million investment
in the Sunny Day Fund, created 5,200 full-time jobs, for a total cost of $6,250 per job.
Professional sports have a small positive effect on earning per employee in the amusement and
recreation sector, but these gains are offset by decreases in earnings and employments in other
sectors (Coates & Humphreys, 2003). Follow-up studies conducted by Jasina and Rotthoff
(2008) have confirmed Coates and Humphreys’ findings, adding further evidence that
employment does not benefit from stadium construction.
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Other cities convince constituents and local governments that the presence of a new
stadium and the fans it attracts will spur ancillary development near the stadium, in turn creating
benefits outside of the stadium itself. These strategies can be seen in practice in multiple
occasions. Worried that losing their football team would hurt local economies, Indianapolis
taxpayers directly subsidized a $20 million renovation in 1998, $12 million in 2003 and $7.2
million in 2006 (Trumpbour, 2006). As recently as March 2021, Augusta, Georgia project
managers claimed they would generate more than $600 million in new spending and new sales
tax dollars over the next 30 years (Augusta Chronicle, 2021). Promising $600 million may sound
appealing, but deeper looks at estimations like this show that these numbers do not materialize.
Overblown projections like this do not factor in opportunity costs taking away from other
industries, double-count sales tax revenues and underestimate final costs of the stadium
construction itself (deMause, 2021).
Some cities disregard economic rationale entirely when constructing a new stadium,
instead arguing that a team is essential to being viewed as major market. In Cincinnati, the entire
campaign to publicly finance two new stadiums was framed around the slogan “Keep Cincinnati
a Major League City.” Growth coalition members eschewed the idea that new stadiums would
provide economic revitalization for Cincinnati, but rather enhance the social status of a
competing city in Ohio (Delaney & Eckstein, 2003). An astroturf organization named Citizens
for a Major League Future relied on large corporations and a D.C. pollster to prey on
Cincinnatians fears that without a sports team, the social status of city would sink lower across
the nation (Fehrman, 2011). In Minneapolis, stadium proponents argued that a new baseball
stadium was important because it would keep the city as one of the few with teams in the major
four sports leagues, a measurement of a first-rate city (Trumpbour, 2006). Part 3 of the literature
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review expands on the intangible benefits raised by the Cincinnati and Minnesota campaigns to
determine if these benefits justify public subsidization.

Part 3: Economic Literature on Intangible Benefits
The previous section argued that the tangible benefits of stadium construction do not
materialize, but a complete analysis must also account for the potential intangible public
benefits. Job numbers and economic benefits are proven to be overstated, but if a new stadium
leads to vast public benefits, perhaps taxpayer contributions are justified. This consideration
leads to several questions that this section will cover in depth. The first question is how much the
intangible benefits of a new stadium are worth to the average citizen. The second question is to
take the valuation assigned to these teams and determine if the public benefits outweigh the
taxpayer contributions.
Determining the value of the intangible benefits offered by sports stadiums is a complex
enterprise, as there are many advantages to measure. Increased merchandise options, more
attractive parking, better food quality or even an upgraded air conditioning system are all
benefits of a new stadium. Additionally, sports are similar to a public good, in that sports are
both non-rivalrous and non-excludable; all fans have the ability to watch a broadcast game, root
for their team collectively and are not barred from viewing due to financial reasons. Sports is one
of countless public good offerings available to citizens, with other examples ranging from
streetlights and lighthouses to flood control systems. Deciphering how much these various goods
are worth is difficult, considering citizens find different goods more or less useful and assigning
tangible value to an intangible benefit is not a common practice. Most have a firm price they

17
would pay for a gallon of milk, but not for how much they would pay for their favorite sports
team.
Regardless of the method used to determine the valuation of a sports team or a new
stadium, fans do not value their team as much as they are paying in subsidies. It may seem
difficult to draw conclusions about intangible data, but the variety of existing shadow pricing
methods in the literature have all reached this same finding. The most popular valuation methods
in sports construction literature are the contingent valuation method (CVM) and hedonic pricing,
as each method breaks down a large-scale issue into smaller parts to obtain a more accurate
valuation. These methods have been used for sports stadiums across the country and in slightly
different manners, but each study has illustrated that the tangible and intangible benefits of sports
stadiums are outweighed by the tangible and intangible costs.
CVM analysis of sports stadiums measures several facets of non-market goods to
determine annual willingness to pay, including civic pride, estimations of the incremental values
of public goods produced and even race relations. A 2001 study surveyed Pittsburgh residents to
find a total discounted non-use value of the Pittsburgh Penguins NHL team to the host
metropolitan statistical area of between $17.2 and $48.3 million (Johnson et al., 2001). This
valuation is not net-zero, indicating that the public certainly values their team highly, but these
figures are only a fraction of the total cost of the new $321 million arena the team eventually
built in 2010. A CVM study conducted in Jacksonville a few years later measured to see if an
NFL franchise elevated the city’s civic status and in turn increased the valuation for its citizens.
The authors found that the present value of public goods created by the Jaguars is $36.5 million
or less, far below subsidies provided to attract the Jaguars (Johnson et al., 2005). Economists
have conducted CVM analyses in other areas such as Baltimore and Kentucky to survey citizens’
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willingness to pay for their own sports teams. In each of these studies, the aggregate valuation of
each team was far less than the proposed stadium renovations in these areas. In other words, the
annual willingness to pay for Jaguars fans or fans of other teams in Pittsburgh and Kentucky was
far below the required number to justify the subsidy. Fans would have to assign a tremendous
amount of value to this public good to warrant the high price tag of the stadiums.
Studies using hedonic pricing reinforce the findings established by CVM studies, in that
the many contributory benefits of stadium construction are not worth the cost. By using
regression analysis to isolate the value of an intangible cost or benefit, hedonic market analysis
looks for the signal among the noise of stadium construction. For stadium construction, a useful
measurement to determine if new stadiums are worth their price is to isolate home values in areas
with old versus new stadiums. By using repeated observations of cities over time, economists
deduced identification of the NFL effect on home prices through franchise expansion and
movement. The authors found that rents are approximately 8 percent higher and wages are 4
percent lower in cities with franchises, though the latter of these two effects is not significant
(Carlino & Coulson, 2004). A study conducted a year later reached a similar conclusion, in that
housing prices near FedEx Stadium in Washington D.C. slightly increased housing values in the
surrounding area (Tu, 2005). Seven years later, an additional study confirmed the preceding
results, in that positive externalities from professional sports facilities may be capitalized into
residential real estate prices (Feng & Humphreys, 2012). Even international studies have
supported these findings, in that the increased home prices in Berlin are minimal in combatting
the negative externalities of stadium construction in surrounding areas (Ahlfeldt & Maennig,
2008).
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The effect of NFL franchises on home values is certainly not net-zero, so owning a home
near these areas during stadium renovations can certainly benefit homeowners. But the key part
of the equation is measuring the assigned value of a new stadium to the public subsidy that
accompanies said stadium. If public subsidies only register in the $10-50 million range in
exchange for a brand-new NFL stadium, this investment would benefit homeowners greatly as
they would see their home prices increase for a relatively cheap cost. Yet, these subsidies have
ranged near or over $1 billion, so an 8 percent increase in home values is not justification for this
huge price tag. The decrease in wages from the Carlino & Coulson study is also an alarming
statistic, as it indicates that homeowner benefits are offset by wage decreases in the area. These
effects are not statistically significant so they cannot be discussed as in-depth as home price
increases, but these findings are certainly worrying. The last consideration added by these studies
is that while having a stadium in the same city may be a benefit, having a stadium next door has
occasionally shown to be harmful. Noise, trash, congestion and construction are all
“disamenities,” in that these previously nonexistent negative externalities are created because of
the new stadium.
CVM and hedonic market analysis are just two of the myriad ways at analyzing the costbenefit analysis of stadium construction, and every method indicates that stadium construction is
problematic. It must be stressed that stadium construction can lead to tangible benefits for many
members of the population, such as a diehard fan. Yet, until the price tag for these projects is
lowered to match the assigned willingness to pay or the average valuation of the team itself,
stadium construction will continue to serve as a poor investment for American communities.
The next question to be answered in this equation is if the tangible and intangible benefits
have been proven to fall beneath taxpayer contributions, why politicians continue to place
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taxpayers on the hook. Having constituents pay for something that is not beneficial seems
counterintuitive to promises made by politicians when running for office. As my theoretical
framework explains, politicians actually have quite compelling reasons to fund these projects.
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Theoretical Framework
CVM and hedonic pricing show that the average taxpayer always ends up with a poor
deal, and yet new stadiums are being built at the quickest rate in recorded history. The literature
on stadium construction’s negative effects is available for any decision maker to observe, but
these very decision makers are all too eager to build the newest stadium. Clearly, these decisions
are not made to stimulate local economies, but rather to achieve some form of political gain. This
section lays out the poltical concepts involved in stadium construction, showing that politicians
have incentive to disregard the taxpayer and seek out these projects.
The study of stadium construction is a classic example of powerful interests exerting their
power over less organized and influential groups. The concentrated gainer and diffuse loser
political market comes under the heading of "client politics,” which arises when an organized
minority or interest group benefits at the expense of the public. Client politics are omnipresent in
the world of governance. Tax policy is a hybrid of majoritarian and client politics; the
majoritarian aspect is that the tax burden of Americans is kept relatively low compared to other
countries and requires everyone to pay, whereas the many loopholes allowing powerful political
leaders or interest groups to obtain special breaks in tax bills reflect client politics. For
appropriations, pork projects taken up by various representatives and members of Congress are
costly and only benefit a very limited number of constituents. Proposed projects such as the
Gravina Island Bridge, colloquially referred to as the “Bridge to Nowhere,” are reflections of
client politics, in that a small number Alaskans pushed strongly for a $398 million project that
would have very little use for anyone outside of their small jurisdiction. Client politics is
apparent in regulatory policies, environmental policy and more. Any time an organized party has
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incentive to exert their sphere of influence to achieve financial or political gain, client politics are
surely present.
Considering that a small coterie of interests is essential to large-scale stadium
construction projects, this phenomenon is similar to the concept of client politics. The classic
analysis of client politics is the seminal work The Politics of Regulation by James Q. Wilson. In
this book, Wilson and colleagues conduct reviews of nine regulatory agencies, with the
concluding chapter summarizing his findings of how these agencies operate. Using Wilson’s
work as a foundation, I describe how client politics presents a useful framework for
understanding the logic of stadium construction.
While subsidies can increase profits, subsidization encourages competition and new
companies to form, in turn reducing the effect of the subsidy. Wilson describes that:

All firms seek to maximize profits, and profits can be increased if competition is reduced,
or government subsidies are obtained. Though firms will not refuse subsidies if they are
offered, subsidies have the disadvantage of increasing profitability without necessarily
restricting entry into the industry. The prospect of these benefits will encourage new
companies to form, increase competition, and thus reduce each firms’ share of subsidies
(Wilson, 1982).
Wilson’s analysis is not a departure of traditional economics, as cheaper cost of entry, in this
case through subsidization, will incentivize firms to enter the market. What makes the NFL,
MLB and other leagues so profitable is that they receive consistent subsidies, while also
maintaining a monopolistic structure that avoids the downfalls of traditional subsidization.
Barriers of entry into these leagues are firm, as each major American sports league has a cap of
roughly 30-32 teams. Receiving a $750 million subsidy, as in the case of the Las Vegas Raiders,
will not subsequently incentivize other parties to create a team and enter the market, because this
possibility does not exist. Many major media markets yearn for sports teams, either for financial
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reasons or to enhance the civic pride of the city, but these leagues understand that 30-32 teams is
their optimal economic outcome. Wilson writes that “subsidies have the disadvantage of
increasing profitability without necessarily restricting entry into the industry,” but the inherent
restrictions of these leagues allow huge amounts of profitability without any considerations for
external competition. Sports teams extract as much as they can from local, state and federal
sources, free from traditional worries that these funds will encourage entry.
The monopolistic structure of these leagues is inherently undemocratic, but many
politicians allow the structure to continue due to potentially substantial advantages. Despite little
financial incentive to pursue these projects, there is high incentivization for politicians to follow
this path:

But it is not necessary to suppose that firms provide cash payoffs to get their way. If they
can influence – by propaganda or campaign contributions – the electoral prospects of
politicians, then these politicians, once in office, can see to it that their bureaucratic
subordinates, the regulatory officials, are selected and instructed so that they serve the
interests of the regulated firms… the economic groups control a disproportionate share of
political resources and that these resources can be used to control the behavior of
administrative agencies.

Politicians carrying out policies that are not beneficial for their constituencies is a quintessential
aspect of client politics. Political figures understand that the influence of these teams, especially
in the perpetual threat of relocation, have substantial implications for their political prospects.
Allowing a team to relocate may be a responsible decision for a local or state government, but
unaware constituents would be angered that their city lost their team. To avoid these outcomes,
affluent “firms,” in this case sports teams with a limited number of employees but vast resources,
receive huge benefits compared to the diffuse losses of thousands or millions of constituents. By
sacrificing the very well-being of the constituents that they hope will reelect them in the next
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term, politicians satisfy the regulated firms for their own political gain. These well-organized
groups are agents for social change, so satisfying the requests of these agencies is a politically
savvy decision. Satisfying a small, organized group may seem counterintuitive, as the vast
majority of constituents do not stand to benefit and would realistically punish politicians for
leaving them worse off. Yet, these individuals are too unorganized and the tax effects too smallscale or complex for many to understand, so politicians continue to satisfy the powerful “client,”
in this case the sports teams.
The behavior of politicians is a much easier proposition when the cost-benefit analysis of
these decisions is apparent. In the same chapter, Wilson argues that:

We want to understand these rewards in order to predict how [politicians] will behave as
regulators. Moreover, the economic perspective is a powerful analytical tool; provided
the facts are consistent with the model, it offers and elegant and parsimonious way of
explaining a great deal of human behavior.

Ideally, politicians are elected to serve a group of constituents. Driven by reelection hopes or the
search for power, many politicians do not abide by this ideal and are, in turn, self-interested or
career oriented. Client politics is one of many instances of governmental action that benefits the
few instead of the many; however, understanding the rewards of this system offers the “elegant
and parsimonious way” of explaining the thought process of these individuals. Public funding for
stadiums has proliferated exponentially since the 1950’s, to the point where most projects are
now publicly funded. Despite this trend harming taxpayers quite directly, there has seldom been
public outcry over the issue. The social and political benefits of obtaining or maintaining a sports
team far outweigh the negligible cost of public anger towards these projects, so there is little
incentive for politicians to reject these deals. Recruiting a new team or building a spectacular,
innovative new stadium can even be seen as an accomplishment only achieved by a responsible,
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respectable politician. Stadium construction as a medium of client politics becomes much clearer
when using Wilson’s idea of reward as a predictor of human behavior. As long as stadium
construction continues to yield rewards, politicians have little incentive to remedy their
decisions. Only when the costs outweigh the reward, whether that be through public protests or
poorer results in elections, will these actions begin to change.
Using Wilson’s analysis of client politics and regulation sets a strong foundation for this
argument, but not all of stadium construction adheres to traditional client politics. The most
notable difference between the theory of client politics and the practice of stadium construction
is secrecy. Normally, client politics is clandestine politics, as the concentrated gainers do not
want many people to know of their actions and will seldom issue press releases bragging of their
tax breaks. Stadium construction differs in that the process is open and available for anyone to
observe, with the gainers counting on the naivete of the taxpayers. Taxpayers are aware of the
project and think it will actually benefit them. Here the machinations of the concentrated
interests are obscured not by secrecy but by complexity.
In The Symbolic Uses of Politics, by political scientist Murray Edelman, Edelman argues
that naivete or political symbolism is used to placate citizens from the reality of a complex issue.
In the book, Edelman lays out the philosophy of “symbolic politics,” which argues that
government regulation of business is a charade that soothes consumers by supplying them with a
pleasant myth rather than tangible benefits:

The systematic research in political science of the last several decades has repeatedly
called attention to wide gulfs of knowledge between our solemnly taught, common sense
assumptions of what political institutions do and what they actually do… many of the
public programs universally taught and believed to benefit a mass public in fact benefit
relatively small groups (Edelman, 1964).
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Stadium construction is certainly an example of Edelman’s theory, in that unaware
citizens are often enthusiastic about the economic prospects of a new stadium due to exaggerated
reports from their representatives. Rhetoric of job creation and economic revitalization are
common explanations for new stadiums, but all this rhetoric accomplishes is to masquerade the
true effects of the stadium itself. Citizen groups that see beyond the façade of stadium
construction have been unsuccessful at convincing others that these benefits are not legitimate.
Perhaps cognitive dissonance that one’s sports team is inherently quite valuable convinces
citizens that a new sports stadium is worth the price tag, or maybe the new infrastructure in the
area convinces others that the stadium is more than just a location for a sports team. Regardless
of the rationale, politicians capitalize on the ignorance of their constituents, using charged
language and overblown economic benefits to achieve public acquiescence.
Client and symbolic politics help uncover why politicians, despite stated economic
disadvantages, support the construction of new stadiums. Some politicians may be simply
unaware of the problem and regret their support after the drawbacks come to fruition, but others
are certainly well-aware of the harms and continue anyways to achieve political gain. In the next
section, I present case studies of the Raiders and Yankees to further develop the idea of client
and symbolic politics and how these theoretical concepts play out in practice. Both case studies
not only branch out these ideas, but represent the themes, strategies and considerations that make
up stadium construction as a whole.
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Case Study #1: Leaving for Luxury - The Las Vegas Raiders

Founded in 1960, the Raiders have been one of the most well-known sports franchises in
American sports, mainly due to the myriad of dedicated fans and a laundry list of Hall of Fame
talents. After Minneapolis accepted an offer to join the established National Football League as
an expansion team, regulations required the American Football League (AFL) to search for their
expansion team to maintain an equal number of teams per league. Oakland was an unlikely
location to inhabit a football franchise, considering the city had not asked for a team, no Oakland
stadium was suitable for an NFL franchise and there was already a successful Bay Area franchise
in the San Francisco 49ers (Dickey, 1991). Yet, when Los Angeles Chargers owner Barron
Hilton threatened to forfeit his franchise unless another West Coast city were awarded the team,
the league rewarded Oakland with a brand-new team. Several prominent businessmen from the
area invested in the new team, working with contractors, real estate developers and local
politicians to sustain the franchise. The Raiders played their first snap of football on September
11, 1960 at Kezar Stadium, a publicly owned and operated stadium in the heart of San Francisco.
After hopping around several venues and consistently posting poor records, several leading
partners threatened to relocate their team unless Oakland provided a new stadium (Dickey,
1991). The city of Oakland obliged, constructing the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, the
home of the Raiders as recently as two years ago.
The Raiders’ recent departure to Las Vegas in 2019 drew great fanfare, yet this was not
the franchise’s first exit. Prior to the 1980 season, Raiders owner Al Davis attempted to improve
the Oakland Coliseum, aiming to install profitable luxury boxes. When Oakland declined to
renovate, Davis signed a signed a Memorandum of Agreement to move the Raiders to Los
Angeles. League owners met this decision with significant pushback; the move required three-
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fourths approval but was defeated 22-0 with five owners abstaining. Unperturbed, Davis
attempted to move the team anyway, but an injunction blocked his plans of relocation.
In response, the Raiders eventually filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, and this
case became a catalyst in allowing future teams to relocate. In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission v. NFL (1981), the Ninth Circuit court deliberated on the question of whether the
NFL consists of separate entities rather than one single enterprise. The court concluded that the
NFL’s member teams are separate business entities, therefore denying the NFL’s motion and
permitting the Raiders to make singular decisions about their future home city (Nieto, 1981). In
1982, the Raiders packed their bags and moved to Los Angeles, filling the gaping hole that
existed in the country’s second-largest media market. When the Colts left Baltimore, owners of
NFL teams voted to take no action, citing the multi-million-dollar verdict they suffered in trying
to stop the Raiders’ move (Doherty, 2007).
This decision may seem to punish the conglomerate of the NFL from restricting
movement, but empirical evidence shows the biggest loser was the taxpayer. NFL team owners
had struck a blow against the NFL’s leverage to stop relocation, as these threats had legal
backing; local governments could no longer rely on the NFL to lend them support in preventing
relocation. Between 2005 and 2020, legislated stadium subsidies, or public appropriations
awarded to stadium proposals without direct approval of citizens, were applied in more than 80%
of all professional stadium projects in North America (Kellison & Mills, 2020). Utilization of
this system is omnipresent in the NFL to this day, and the 1982 Raiders were a key catalyst in
this development.
In exploring opportunities for the Raiders’ relocation, Las Vegas emerged as the leading
candidate, due to an intriguing medley of private investors, limited competition and substantial
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public incentives (Mayer & Cocco, 2020). In late 2016, the county and the franchise reached a
deal to subsidize a nearly $2 billion stadium, with the public sector responsible for contributing
40%, or $750 million. This number set the new record for public contribution, not in the NFL,
but for any of the major sports leagues. Other sources of funding come from a $261 million Bank
of America loan, as well as a $162.2 million loan from the NFL (Saraceno, 2017).
Nicknamed the “Death Star” due to its intimidating appearance and reflective black
paneling, the 1.75 million square foot Allegiant Stadium was fully operational for the first time
in the 2020 season. The stadium has 9.85 miles of wire ropes to suspend the etfe roof, 28,000
tons of structural steel, an amount heavier than Statue of Liberty, and 105,000 cubic yards of
concrete for 257 miles of sidewalk, which equals the distance from Las Vegas to Los Angeles
(Gutierrez, 2020). Current Raiders owner Mark Davis also prioritized the interconnectivity of the
fan experience, wanting to create a stadium that would become a cultural icon. Allegiant has
1,700 WiFi access points, 227 miles of cable, 2,200 TV screens and even a “selfie station”
featuring the Las Vegas strip, features that no stadium has ever implemented (Barrabi, 2020).

Stadium Construction Process:
In order to fund this expensive and state-of-the-art stadium, Las Vegas representatives
followed past precedent and relied heavily on taxpayer contributions. The answer was a .88%
increase in the hotel tax, which consultants claimed would pay off all the municipal bonds the
city had invested. Local and state governments would accrue additional revenue through a
combination of municipal bonds and tourist tax increases (Mayer & Cocco, 2020). With the
majority of funding coming from an increase in the hotel tax, lawmakers espoused that this tax
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would primarily affect visitors and any negative economic impact would be negligible for Las
Vegans.
Economists agree that this rationale was not based in economic theory, but rather in
conjecture from the Raiders’ owner and consultants charged with convincing the parties
involved. The basis of the disagreement stems from the incidence of the hotel tax. Previous
literature of hotel taxes shows that increased taxes lead to a decrease in both hotel occupancy and
a decrease in the next of tax price received by hotels (Collins & Stephenson, 2017). The notion
that hotel taxes will be paid by visitors from outside the taxing jurisdiction carries much appeal
among state and local government leaders seeking to avoid angering local voters. However,
empirical evidence shows that the economic distortions created by hotel taxes adversely affect
the city instituting the tax. Since there are 147,238 hotel rooms in Las Vegas and nearly 50
million tourists visit each year, the effect of this change is potentially highly disruptive (Hotel
Valuation Index, 2018). Separate sports consultants and advisors not working on the project,
such as former executive Jim Nagourney, agreed that the team’s forecast for outside fans and
hotel taxes were exaggerated to convey public benefit (Belson, 2020).
State leaders who voted in 2016 to sink $750 million into the stadium were also sold on
construction jobs the project would generate. They were told, from consultants on the project and
Raiders front office members, that the stadium would create 18,000 jobs, including 11,000
“person-years of employment” to build the stadium itself (Gentry, 2020). Jeremy Aguero, a lead
consultant for Applied Analysis (the firm that handled the construction of Allegiant Stadium),
said that “the entire idea of the public's investment in Allegiant Stadium was largely to drive
additional activity from an economic standpoint.” This was music to the ears of Nevada
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lawmakers, considering the sheer amount of construction jobs that evaporated during the Great
Recession.
Despite claims from various Las Vegas stakeholders, Allegiant Stadium construction did
not spur job growth. After completion of the stadium itself, a report from the contractor revealed
that the project created 5,656,218 hours of construction labor (Las Vegas Stadium Authority,
2020). That is only 2,719 full-time equivalent jobs, or approximately 900 in each of the three
years of construction, around a quarter of the initial estimate. Former State Senator Patricia
Farley, who voted to shuffle tax revenue to construct the stadium, remarked that she was “highly
disappointed” in the discrepancy between the reality and the projections (Gentry, 2020). “It’s a
forewarning to future legislators asked to consider these types of ventures,” Farley said. “There
are no consequences when those who stand to benefit the most are knowingly not truthful when
testifying to the Legislature.” Owners, with perpetual leverage over these processes, never meet
their comeuppance, instead placing the burden on the taxpayer. Examples of new sports
stadiums’ inability to create new construction jobs is well-established, but Las Vegas
representatives and stakeholders did not heed to these lessons.

Economic Analysis:
A deeper dive into the broader economics behind the decision to fund Allegiant Stadium
yields the same results; Las Vegas’ revenue sources show that the investment is not sound.
Aguero argued that they expect 35 percent of fans for events in the stadium to come from outside
Las Vegas, and each out-of-town fan to stay an average of 3.2 nights and spend $820 per trip
(Belson, 2020). Therefore, using Aguero’s numbers of projected outside fans coming to
Allegiant, Las Vegas would accrue $18.65 million yearly off of the Raiders. Concerts and other
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events will generate additional revenue, so this number is likely slightly higher than the initial
estimation.
Regardless of how much these stadiums make, a few caveats exist that diminish out-oftown guests’ revenues. This calculation assumes gross profit, not net, and stadiums are extremely
expensive to maintain. In 2014, the home of the Seattle Seahawks, CenturyLink Field, cost
$16.44 million to maintain (Washington State Public Stadium Authority, 2014). For the
Minnesota Vikings’ new stadium, the city of Minneapolis will pay $7.5 million annually, with
these costs set to increase each year in order to maintain a first-class stadium (Kaszuba, 2012).
Cities are often on the hook for part or most of renovation costs, with constant threats of
relocation if they do not undergo renovations or upgrades as deemed essential by the owners.
Another issue with Aguero’s estimate is the potential overestimation of out-of-town fans in the
first place. It may seem that Aguero was correct in estimating how many non-Las Vegas
individuals will attend the games – approximately 40% of tickets acquired have been from
outside of Nevada (Ticketing Business News, 2020). However, many of these tickets were
acquired by California residents, many of whom will make the drive to the games and will not
spend 3 nights in Las Vegas. Other savvy buyers, understanding the value of tickets to a new
stadium, could purchase tickets and resell them above face value to Las Vegas residents close to
game day, rendering the out-of-town benefits as moot. The numbers Aguero provides are eyepopping, but concealed costs and potential overestimation of out-of-town visitors are likely to
diminish any benefits Las Vegas hoped to reap.
Another argument made by proponents is that the Las Vegas Raiders would become an
important part of the Las Vegas economy, supplementing traditional Las Vegas industries such
as tourism and gambling. These arguments are certainly a stretch, considering the sheer size of
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these two industries in the city. Before the pandemic hit, 49.5 million tourists visited Las Vegas,
spending $34.5 billion directly for a total economic impact of $57.6 billion (LVCVA, 2019). In
the 2019 fiscal year, 169 large casinos in Las Vegas reported total revenues of nearly $22 billion.
Their aggregate net income almost reached $2 billion (PaySpace, 2020). Even the most generous
estimates, which predict that Las Vegas would make tens of millions per year in revenue off the
stadium, would barely move the needle on the overall economy. Considering the $750 million
taxpayer cost of the stadium and estimates to make roughly $20 million annually, it would take
37.5 years for the investment to break even. Meanwhile, teams usually threaten to relocate unless
they receive a new stadium roughly every 25 years (Ortiz & Glier, 2016). By the time that the
stadium would become even slightly profitable, the average stadium stint suggests that the
Raiders would have either left or demanded a new stadium. This calculation does not even
consider maintenance costs or the economic displacement stadiums have on surrounding
businesses.
Allegiant Stadium may not benefit Las Vegas, but there is no doubt that the Raiders
organization will profit substantially. Directly after the stadium was built, the Raiders’ valuation
surpassed $3 billion, ranking twelfth among the 32 teams in the league. Only five years ago,
when playing in the dilapidated Oakland Coliseum, the Raiders were worth $1.4 billion, 31 st out
of the 32 teams (Ozanian & Badenhousen, 2020). Additionally, with the NFL soaring in
popularity in recent years, lucrative television deals from major networks have become
commonplace. CBS, NBC and Fox shelled out a total of $39.6 billion between the 2014 and
2022 seasons, and these fees are set to rise by about 7% annually in 2022, meaning they will
each be paying the NFL more than $2 billion per year (Draper, 2021). ESPN will pay about $2.7
billion a year on average, up from their previous payment of $2 billion. With a media market
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clamoring for a football team, the international brand of the Raiders and a brand-new stadium
ready for broadcast, the Raiders realized that relocating to Las Vegas would afford them these
highly profitable deals.
Television deals are clearly the golden goose of the entire operation, but ticket sales are a
steady source of cash that helps owners and the front office remain profitable. The new Allegiant
Stadium has a capacity of 65,000 fans and the stadium will host 8 games per year. The pandemic
has severely reduced supply and increased demand, so while ticket prices right now are more
expensive than normal, ticket costs are projected to average $153.47 when life returns to normal.
With these factors in place, the Raiders would accrue $79.8 million in gross ticket sales. Clearly,
the Raiders would not collect all of this, as much of this revenue is distributed: typically, 55% of
that revenue is used to pay athletes, 10% goes to general stadium administration, 5% goes to the
team’s coaching staff, 5% is paid in taxes, and the remaining 8% is profit (Sportico, 2019).
Assuming the 8% margin, the total profit from ticket sales is roughly $6.4 million annually.
Hoping to sell tickets in a manner that would pay off their construction costs, the Raiders
utilized the controversial practice of personal seat licenses (PSL) in search for even more
revenue. PSLs allow teams to grant fans the right to buy season tickets for a certain seat in a
stadium across several seasons. The Raiders raised a whopping $549.2 million in PSL revenues;
the Raiders used this money as the direct contribution to the construction of the $1.97 billion
stadium project (Snel, 2020). Fans paid anywhere from $500 to $75,000 to secure exclusive
rights to their seats, and fans still have to spend more on the price of the ticket for the eight home
games at each NFL stadium with these licenses (Belson, 2020). Under ideal circumstances, the
PSL holder can sell individual games above face value or resell the license for more than they
originally paid. In practice, the values of PSLs fluctuate often based on factors such as team

35
record, fan engagement and stadium quality, and can even lose their value entirely if a team
relocates, such as St. Louis in 2016 (Barrabi, 2020). Fans, generally, do not understand the
inherent risk in these investments; many have taken out loans and spent thousands on down
payments just to secure the rights to the seats, not the seats themselves.

Discussion:
The aforementioned evidence shows that the affluent partners of the Las Vegas Raiders
are the beneficiary of the new Allegiant Stadium, rather than taxpayers or the greater economy.
This raises the question of why Las Vegas politicians would sponsor such a measure, knowing
that these deals do not stand to benefit their constituents. Here is where the theory of client
politics can shed light on the logic of stadium construction. Knowing that Las Vegans were in
search of a new football team, these politicians worked together with a powerful “client,” in this
case the Raiders, to improve their political prospects. Las Vegas politicians funded the stadium
and lured the Raiders, making it two teams they had successfully recruited in two years – Las
Vegas also won an NHL expansion team in 2017. Economic considerations aside, recruiting two
teams in such a short span sends a message that Las Vegas is a growing city capable of hosting
sports teams; studies have shown that citizens place value on having sports teams in their city,
even if they do not follow the team themselves (Owen, 2006). Politicians reap the positive
political gain, as Las Vegans praise those who were the driving force behind their new teams.
Meanwhile, since many Americans are unaware of the economic toll, politicians are able to
masquerade the economic disadvantages of their actions.
There was little incentive for policymakers to subject a stadium-subsidy plan to a
referendum or initiative because it could open the possibility that voters would reject the
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proposal (Kellison & Mills, 2020). By closing off avenues for the citizenry to disrupt the
construction process, politicians gain the benefits of sports teams in their city while minimizing
their costs. Politicians are able to satisfy the organized interest group, in this case the Raiders,
while also benefiting from constituents who are unaware they are being harmed. Client politics is
a nontransparent system, and Las Vegas politicians demonstrated how this secrecy plays out.
Client politics is likely not the only factor that led to the approval of Allegiant Stadium:
Las Vegas lawmakers may have seen the gaudy economic projections and voted to support.
Applied Analysis testified that the stadium would bring $620 million in annual economic activity
and thousands of jobs, an estimate that compares to the enormously profitable casino industry
(Southern Nevada Tourism Infrastructure Committee, 2016). Representatives such as Senator
Farley heard testimony from these stakeholders, believed the numerical figures and subsequently
voted in favor of the stadium. In an interview with a local Nevada newspaper, Nevada Attorney
General Aaron Ford, a state senator in 2016, said that he could not “leave [the] chamber and look
a laborer in the eye and say I had a chance to give you a job, but I didn’t” (Gentry, 2020). Farley
added that he was persuaded by his constituents, many of whom were in the construction sector
and had struggled to find work since the Great Recession. Farley and Ford were disappointed in
the job and economic results, mainly because they believed the exaggerated projections and were
not aware that stadium construction often results in negative outcomes.
Since Allegiant Stadium is so new and has not even welcomed fans inside due to
COVID-19 protocols, a complete economic analysis is hard to conduct. Yet, if the early reports
are any indication, Allegiant Stadium will prove to be an unwise investment for the city of Las
Vegas, as the nearly $2 billion price tag has not created as many benefits as once promised. The
intrinsic public benefit of Allegiant Stadium must be considered, as there are new intangible
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benefits catalyzed by the stadium: a state-of-the-art facility with new businesses and restaurants
is an attractive proposition to most. However, as many previous studies measuring the intangible
benefits of sports stadiums have concluded, these amenities will certainly not justify the $750
million price tag. Las Vegas citizens should be excited that they have a new football team in their
area, as well as a beautiful new stadium that will host many exciting events in the future. Yet, if
these citizens were aware of the economic overestimations and the political machinations
required to build their stadium, they would realize that their new stadium is not all that it is made
out to be.
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Case Study #2: Dropping the Ball – The Bronx Bombers and New York Politicians
The New York metropolitan area is densely populated with stadiums and areas as well as
people. Within a 60-mile radius of Madison Square Garden in the heart of Manhattan, there are
four stadiums and four arenas, totaling roughly 335,000 seats in total for baseball, hockey,
basketball, football and soccer teams. Sitting in the Bronx, Yankee Stadium is perhaps the most
famous, known for its pristine white arches and stylistic logo perched atop the entrance from the
161st Street subway exit. Known as the “Cathedral of Baseball,” the original Yankee Stadium
was the long-time home of the Yankees, with the team playing there from 1923 to 1973 and then
from 1976 to 2008. The Yankees have a celebrated past with more World Series championships
than any other franchise and legends by the name of Babe Ruth and Joe DiMaggio. What is less
celebrated is the lengthy and controversial process of building the new stadium, as well as its toll
it took on New York infrastructure and constituents alike.
Now a coveted franchise known by most baseball fans, the Yankees were once a
relatively obscure team. In 1922, Yankees owner Jacob Ruppert funded the entire Yankee
Stadium, spending $2.4 million, or only $345 million in 2021 dollars (Sullivan, 2008). With a
new stadium at their disposal, the Yankees, with Babe Ruth at the helm, rose to become
baseball’s most respected and successful franchise, winning a World Series every two years, on
average. But when CBS purchased the team in 1964 for $13.2 million, the success ground to a
halt, and the “Bronx Bombers” finished no higher than 3rd for a decade. Taking a backseat to the
successful New York Mets in Queens, CBS decided to offload its underperforming asset to a
group of investors. The tides changed dramatically in New York when in 1973, George
Steinbrenner and a consortium of investors purchased the franchise for $10 million. The Yankees
returned to their old success, winning several more championships and even earning a new
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stadium in the process. As it stands, the Yankees are now worth $5 billion, or the second most
expensive team behind the Dallas Cowboys. Adjusted for inflation, Steinbrenner and his partners
increased the Yankees’ valuation 96x higher than the original investment (Gough, 2020).
The Yankees did not need public subsidies to fund their stadium, as the affluent owners
of the team, in conjunction with substantial revenues from a variety of sources, would have
easily covered the cost of the stadium. Not only do the Yankees earn the highest valuation, but
they are also the richest team in baseball, with annual revenues over $300 million and giant
television deals with local and national partners. The Yankees also accrue additional revenue
from their own cable TV network, $117 million in gate receipts, and $30 million in licensed
merchandise, granting them the largest payroll, as well (Harrington, 2011). The Yankees had
fallen to fifth in total ticket revenues during the 1996 season, but the club’s total revenues were
$129 million – $26 million more than the next-closest franchise and more than twice the average
of other MLB teams (Stern, 1998). Yet, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, Steinbrenner
threatened to relocate the team, arguing that the run-down neighborhood in the southwest Bronx
made it impossible to attract enough fans to keep the Yankees competitive.
Due to perpetual threats that he would move the Yankees, Steinbrenner leveraged his
asset and reached a lucrative deal to stay in New York. Steinbrenner negotiated a $2.3 billion
new stadium with $1.2 billion in public subsidies, far surpassing the record for overall public
funding towards a stadium. Even when discounting the $417 million in property-tax breaks, it is
still one of the largest stadium subsidies ever, and the Yankees are only on the hook for $670
million. The main question of this case study is understanding why New York politicians obliged
the Yankees. To do so, I first analyze the political maneuverings associated with Yankee
Stadium construction, and then move into an economic analysis of the stadium and various
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loopholes utilized by stadium proponents. As with the Raiders case study and the myriad other
examples of stadium construction, the purported economic benefits and political leverage offered
by this deal were key in the approval and construction of Yankee Stadium.

Stadium Construction Process:
Satisfying constituents certainly was not the motive for building the stadium, as previous
referendums on stadium construction had failed in the New York metropolitan area. In 1984,
New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean authorized the use of land for a new baseball stadium in the
Meadowlands, but the state legislature voted against the measure (Peterson, 1995). In 1987, New
Jersey voters rejected a proposal that would allocate $185 million of public financing to the
construction of a new Yankee Stadium (Sandomir, 2008). Despite public opinion suggesting that
New Jersey citizens would not welcome the Yankees, Steinbrenner continued to use relocation as
a threat towards New York City lawmakers. In 1988, Mayor Ed Koch agreed to have city
taxpayers fund $80 million for lucrative luxury boxes at Yankee Stadium; Steinbrenner initially
agreed, but then rescinded on the offer, realizing he could extract more from politicians desperate
to hold on to their team. This pattern would reoccur, and by 1995, Steinbrenner had rejected 13
proposals to keep the Yankees in the Bronx (Sandomir, 1995).
While it may seem as if Steinbrenner held all the political leverage in these negotiations,
a deeper look at the context of the issue reveals that his bargaining power was quite limited.
Steinbrenner’s biggest constraint was the possibility that he would have to finance the entire
stadium in New Jersey. Governor Christie Whitman had said repeatedly that she would not spend
tax dollars on a ballpark and would not accommodate a new team unless the financial data
showed a solid investment (Pooley, 1995). He would also have to absorb a fierce public relations
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hit, as the optics of moving the storied New York franchise would have angered New York
residents. Yet, New York politicians, terrified of the political implications of losing one of the
most storied franchises in sports, focused more heavily on reaching a deal than calling
Steinbrenner’s bluff.
New York’s most powerful figures often reneged on campaign promises or their political
philosophies in order eliminate any risk of the Yankees leaving town. Mayor Rudy Giuliani,
despite promises to lower taxes and reduce government intrusion into the economy, announced
tentative billion-dollar deals with the Yankees and Mets towards the end of his term in 2001
(Harrington, 2011). This political gambit by Giuliani was savvy, as he attached his name to the
legacy of the fields while also placing the onus of blame on his successor, Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, if negotiations were to sour. Bloomberg referred to Giuliani’s proposal as “corporate
welfare,” but his viewpoint shifted after realizing the gravity the Yankees had on his
performance as mayor. Despite budget gaps estimated at $3 billion in 2008, Bloomberg
encouraged state and local officials to help fund Yankee Stadium’s price tag (Damiani &
Steinberg, 2008). Because the Yankees carry so much cultural capital, any mayor who were to
lose the team would anger the Yankee faithful, which could reflect in the next election. Giuliani
and Bloomberg understood that public financing may be an unpopular decision among New
Yorkers, but losing the team could lead to their political downfall.
New York’s government agencies also participated in sly undertakings by gaming the tax
system and perpetually underestimating construction costs. In testimony presented to the
Independent Budget Office, the New York City Council Finance Committee explained that over
a 30-year period, subsidies and exemptions would cost the city $170 million (IBO, 2006). This
testimony vastly underestimated the total cost of public financing, as the final number ended up
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closer to $1.2 billion. By fronting the construction costs, it appeared as if the Yankees would pay
for most of the stadium; however, they were not required to pay rent, mortgage recording taxes,
or sales tax, and these subsidies cost the taxpayers. In an audit of the Yankees Stadium, the Chief
Counsel of the IRS revealed that the Yankees had taken advantage of a loophole that allowed
sports stadiums the benefit of tax-exempt financing. Using this method, the Yankees saved
$189.9 million in construction costs, according to New York City’s Independent Budget Office
(IBO, 2006). In 2008, the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform questioned
the practices of the new Yankees Stadium in a hearing titled “Gaming the Tax Code.” The
hearing revealed how federal taxpayers were deprived of $950 million due to the non-taxable
nature of the bonds, as well as the monopolistic structure of the Yankees and the MLB as a
whole. The president of the Yankees, Randy Levine, admitted in his written testimony that the
Yankees would have left the Bronx if they did not receive payment-in-lieu-of-taxes financing,
further contributing to the evidence that the Yankees took advantage of their bargaining leverage.
Mayors and prominent agencies were highly involved in permitting Yankee Stadium’s
construction, but local representatives also featured in the equation. In a process that took nine
days and involved no public opinion or referendum, New York city policymakers agreed to build
over Macomb’s Dam Park and a section of John Mullaly Park – popular destinations in the
Bronx – and then have New York taxpayers pay $130 million to replace them. There were
several groups of residents that organized to prevent relocation, including Save Our Parks, Bronx
Voices for Equal Inclusion and Save Yankee Stadium (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). Yet,
Council Member Maria del Carmen Arroyo said that her constituency did not reach out to her
regarding the proposal. Arroyo was correct in that her constituency was not very vocal about the
issue, but the lack of pushback was not due to widespread public approval but rather a nine-day
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window to vocalize complaints (Mindlin, 2005). The actions of New York representatives like
Arroyo draw parallels to those of Bloomberg and Giuliani – no matter the public resistance to the
stadium, keeping the Yankees in the Bronx was far too important to their political careers to
consider otherwise.

Economic Analysis:
With all of the political background aside, understanding the economics behind this
decision gives an objective look at whether the stadium was worth the price. Below, I outline
why the stadium is largely not worth its price despite several economic reports indicating
otherwise. The only party that benefitted financially from the new stadium were the Yankees
themselves. The new stadium followed a similar trend as many other new stadiums, in that the
inhabiting team increased their valuation dramatically after construction ended. From 1998 to
2011, the Yankees valuation increased from roughly $400 million to $1.35 billion, a sizable
237% increase in total and 18.23% yearly. As soon as Yankee Stadium was finished, the
valuation rose from 1.35 billion to its current $5 billion valuation, a 270% increase and 30%
yearly (Forbes, 2020).
The Yankees benefitted handsomely from the construction project, but these benefits did
not trickle down to the taxpayers. The City of New York and two public benefit corporations, the
Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) and the Economic Development Corporation
(EDC) released a General Project Plan (GPP) that outlined the financial considerations of the
stadium. Some highlights from the GPP included $70 million for new parking garages, a
property tax exemption of $44 million and tax breaks on mortgage recording taxes and sales
taxes (NY Parks & Recreation, 2006). The Yankees fronted the construction costs for the
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stadium itself, but the rest of the bill would be paid by taxpayers as the Yankees were exempt
from these payments. The Yankees also exercised various clauses in New York City’s
infrastructure program, including the Empire Zone program, which encourages business
development in designated areas, as well as the Industrial and Commercial Incentive Program,
which provides a property tax break to commercial buildings that are physically improved,
expanded or newly constructed (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). The Yankees ostensibly fronted
the cost for the construction, but the sheer number of provisions and tax breaks in place allowed
them to shell out a negligible net payment in the end.
Tax breaks for the Yankees not only covered their costs but deprived a substantial source
of revenue from the city when they did not collect the payments. Because subsidies for sports
stadiums typically involve direct public expenditures for the construction of the facility, revenue
sources such as rent and taxes spurred by the stadium would ideally be recovered by the city.
However, the financing arrangement for the Yankee Stadium project involved a contribution of
over $200 million from the city and state for up-front costs including parking garages and
replacement parks (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). Revenue sources designed to benefit the city
were unable to be recuperated, and the burden fell on the New York taxpayer to fund these
payments.
Perhaps these taxpayer costs would be justified by the economic revenue created by a
new stadium, but this is not the case. The Yankees generated $683 million in total revenue in
2019 – an impressive number – but much of this number is diluted by player salaries, stadium
upkeep and administration costs. Additionally, because the Yankees maneuvered their way out of
tax and rent payments, this revenue is not reinvested back into the city and instead goes back to
the team itself. Therefore, when New York City or the Yankees project total generated revenue
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to impress their constituents, their estimates tend to be far greater than the actual result. For
instance, an analysis by the New York City Economic Development Corporation estimated that
the 2018 home opener would generate $6.6 million in revenue, due to 25,000+ visitors travelling
to New York City and creating economic activity for local businesses (NYCEDC, 2018).
Nevertheless, this estimate projects $5.2 million in indirect economic impact, which factors in
the spending of Yankee Stadium employees and companies who benefit from the spike in visitor
expenditure. As previous literature covers, outside visitors may spur some level of growth, but
the economic displacement of spending at stadiums versus other businesses in the area create a
zero-sum outcome. The net revenue may be close to $6.6 million, but these predications fail to
take into account the influence of Yankee Stadium and its ability to take away from surrounding
industries.
Politicians and the Yankees front office promised job growth, but the estimations from
both parties were far different than the results. Supporters of the stadium believed that Yankee
Stadium would create 1,000 permanent jobs, based on Levine’s estimate. This estimate differs
from city and state-sponsored research, which put the figure at 700 and 598 jobs, respectively. In
reality, the official job creation was closer to 15-30 full-time jobs, as most of the jobs were
seasonal or temporary (IBO, 2006 & Dwyer, 2009). Creating these jobs is one part of the
equation but ensuring that jobs actually provide long-term opportunities for New Yorkers is
another challenge. The head of several development corporations on the project said that there
was no means to ensure the Yankees create their target number of jobs; as the results show, the
Yankees overpromised and undelivered (Dwyer, 2009).
Arguments for neighborhood revitalization make little sense, considering that the new
Yankees Stadium is directly across the street from its former home. Despite New York officials
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arguing otherwise, the new stadium does not draw more economic activity than its predecessor,
as many attendees of the Yankees are either New York residents or tourists that would attend the
game anyways. The IBO reasoned that providing a new or substantially refurbished stadium to
the Yankees would generate an additional $111 million in economic activity and $5 million in
city revenues (IBO, 2006). Much of this revenue would derive from increased ticket prices at the
Stadium; however, ticket prices have actually decreased from $51.83 in 2010 to $47.62 in 2019
(Gough, 2020). Although a new shopping mall, the Gateway Center, has opened at the nearby
Bronx Terminal Market and has provided many new minimum-wage jobs, the profits go to major
corporations rather than the people of the Bronx (Harrington, 2011). The Gateway Center has
also hurt small businesses in the area, as many Bronx businesses have reported that their profits
have shrunk as much as 50% since the new Yankee Stadium opened (Harrington, 2011).
Not only are there negligible benefits created by Yankee Stadium, but many proposed
features included in official reports are either nonexistent or less than promised. One report
included that there would be a passive park, named Ruppert Plaza, that would comprise of an
allee of trees on 1.13 acres of new parkland. The design of Ruppert Plaza would include
significant landscaping, including shaded areas and passive park amenities, such as benches,
resting areas, and pedestrian walkways (NY Parks & Rec, 2006). In reality, Ruppert Plaza is a
parking garage, with no park features and no additional park land added in comparison to the
older stadium. Several other proposals, including 14 tennis courts above a parking garage on
161st street, streetscape improvements and replacement facilities, are simply non-existent. The
project’s Draft Environmental Impact Statement argues that the 3,000 new parking spaces would
not result in additional vehicle trips and would ease traffic in the neighborhood. This claim goes
against well-established parking data, as the availability of parking is a key determinant in how
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fans get to the venue (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). Changes or restructuring is commonplace
during a major construction project like Yankee Stadium, but many of these improvements that
were attractive to taxpayers, fans and citizens alike were not similar to the proposal.

Discussion:
Now that the stadium has been in place for over a decade, the Yankees faithful has
returned mixed reviews. One prominent criticism from the earlier years was the poor layout of
the stadium itself, as the seating area in center field obstructs the views from bleacher seats on
both sides and seats near home plate are inaccessible for fans to interact with players (Kepner,
2009). In the 2016-2017 season, the Yankees decided to renovate the bleacher area, adding
additional costs to the original construction project. Other construction problems include large
cracks in the stadium’s concrete ramps, and the company involved drew criticism from mob
connections and a propensity to forge test results (Rashbaum & Belson, 2009). Another criticism
has been the lack of fan noise, a complaint that has been shared by fans and players alike. Many
Yankees players, including legends Mariano Rivera and Derek Jeter, said that the new stadium
lost the aura of the previous storied stadium. In his autobiography, Rivera wrote that the stadium
“doesn’t hold noise, or home-team fervor, anywhere near the way the old place did. The old
Stadium was our 10th man—a loud and frenzied cauldron of pinstriped passion, with a lot of
lifers in the stands.” (Rivera & Coffey, 2014). The stadium is certainly beautiful, but these
criticisms, in conjunction with the high public cost and a loss of public parkland, challenge the
utility of the new stadium.
Whether to achieve political gain or avoid poor political outcomes, client politics can
help us understand how this state of affairs came to be. The Yankees front office carried a
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tremendous amount of leverage and took advantage, as the departure of their team would be
catastrophic for New York politicians. The Yankees forced New York politicians to contribute a
massive amount of funding to the overall total; however, harming the diffuse and unknowing
taxpayer was preferable to losing the beloved Yankees. And while there were citizen groups that
organized to prevent the stadium’s construction, politicians purposefully sped up the process to
shut out the citizenry from having any say. The actions of politicians to appease the organized
minority, in this case the Yankees, while spreading out the losses across millions of New
Yorkers, is a classic case of client politics.
Quantifying the public good benefit of the new stadium is difficult, as Yankees fans are
notoriously passionate for their team and may evaluate their team differently than previous CVM
or hedonic models. Yet, the tactics utilized by politicians and Yankees front office to build the
stadium raise questions to how beneficial the stadium truly is. This case study highlights the
high-stakes decision-making of political leaders and economic interests, and its public cost
serves as an example for many of the high-priced stadiums introduced in recent decades. Yet, at
its foundation, Yankee Stadium is one of the many instances of how the concentrated gainers of
stadium construction triumph over the dispersed, poorly organized taxpayers. The powerful
Yankees, with help from prominent politicians, used their bargaining power over taxpayers that
were too spread apart to effectively create a coalition or any form of resistance. The result: a
brand-new Yankee Stadium, one that favors public officials’ political prospects and the Yankees
but once again harms the taxpayer.
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Lessons Learned: Zooming Out Domestically and Internationally
When analyzing other stadium construction projects and their backgrounds, the Raiders
and Yankees are not extreme examples, but rather representative of this public policy issue. The
two cases yield valuable lessons that are generalizable to other settings. Firstly, powerful
interests are able to yield a disproportionate amount of power in this domain, and by doing so
they harm a significant portion of taxpayers in the region. Politicians oblige these processes, both
to mitigate risk but also to benefit politically. Secondly, politicians and owners alike
systematically overestimate the benefits of new stadiums to sell the stadium as a solid investment
and to limit potential pushback. Lastly, while intangible benefits are present in stadium
construction, they do not justify the expenditures for new stadiums. These lessons help set the
stage for the following discussion, which zooms out from the Yankees and Raiders to apply these
findings to other contexts.
The underestimation of public costs seen in New York is a widespread problem in sports
construction. The Atlanta Falcons – an NFL team – are similar to the Yankees in that they vastly
underestimated the price tag for their stadium. The initial estimate for Mercedes Benz Stadium,
their new stadium, was $1 billion in total, with total public funding coming in at $200 million.
These figures were below the final total by hundreds of millions of dollars. After problems with
the construction itself and the need for more capital, politicians ended up shelling out over $1
billion in public funding, $248 million of which was issued through local bonds (McDonald,
2016). Combined with $77 million in sales tax rebates, infrastructure investments and usage of
city-provided land, as well as annual payments for renovations and the eventual demolition of
the stadium, Atlantans will be responsible for over five times the initial $200 million estimate. If
all taxpayers were aware of these costs, there would likely be much more resistance to these
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deals. Interested parties minimize pushback from the public by utilizing lesser-known payment
methods, such as tax-exempt municipal bonds, or by omitting future costs of renovation. The
income that lenders earn on municipal bonds is exempt from federal income taxes, meaning that
the taxpayer needs to make up the difference not covered by taxation; unfortunately, the average
American is not aware of these complexities. Construction costs are easy to understand, but
municipal bond structures are not, so taxpayers contribute funds without understanding where
their money goes. The other strategy is to obscure renovation payments as a part of the public’s
tax contribution. As the Raiders case study indicated, renovation costs tally in the tens of
millions per year, much of which falls on the taxpayer. These costs are incurred in the future and
are not part of the original expense report for a stadium, so the public is often not aware that they
will have to pay even more than they had thought initially.
The Yankees and Raiders case studies highlighted how politicians overestimate job
growth, and this pattern is not exclusive to these two stadiums. In St. Louis, statistical evidence
suggested that the levels of employment in the construction industry were neither higher nor
lower during the construction of two new stadiums (Miller, 2016). To replace Candlestick Park,
the proponents for a publicly funded stadium created the slogan “Build the stadium – create the
jobs!” (Noll & Zimbalist, 2011). These proponents argued that, similar to the Yankees and the
Raiders, that new infrastructure and stores near the stadium would create new job growth in areas
desperately needing help. The final result was similar to St, Louis’, in that the stadium only
created 60 full-time jobs (Avalos, 2014). Instead of focusing on permanent job growth,
politicians use part-time and temporary job estimates and then promulgate this information. For
instance, the replacement for Candlestick Park, Levi’s Stadium, technically created 12,000 new
jobs with the rest dissolving as construction ended. Yankee Stadium and Allegiant Stadium both
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created thousands as well, but the final estimates are reduced to near-zero after construction jobs
end. Many of these jobs are also transferred jobs, as workers will move from their positions as
security guards or concession workers at old stadiums and occupy the same position at the new
stadium. Instead of focusing on total job output, politicians cleverly count all the jobs required to
build the stadium, leading to perceived job growth that does not really exist.
Another justification of stadium construction not specific to the Raiders and Yankees is
that a new facility will catalyze economic development in the area. While there is evidence that
sports facilities offer opportunities to spur economic growth at the local level, such as the reuse
of underutilized buildings, economic development is not guaranteed (Chapin, 2007). Baltimore is
considered as a success story in this area, in that they utilized old warehouses and dilapidated
infrastructure and developed a stadium now considered to be one of the most beautiful in all of
sports. And yet, despite the Orioles drawing in fans from all over the country, the City of
Baltimore receives a net of less than $40,000 every year after its $1 million annual payment
towards stadium debt (Dougherty, 2014). Other cities such as Cleveland, Boston, Denver,
Indianapolis and Phoenix have also pledged economic redevelopment, but studies have shown
that these promises have not lived up to expectations (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2016).
Constituents may be enthusiastic with the significant amounts of revenue produced by sports
teams, but economic development should not be confused with economic distribution. There is
an opportunity cost associated with a new stadium, because if the stadium did not exist,
constituents would spend their money in other areas.
The downfalls of stadium construction may appear uniquely American, but the dynamics
that played out in New York and Las Vegas appear to be universal. International governments
fall into two categories when trying to build a stadium and host an event. The first is similar to
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American construction projects, in which governments believe that a large-scale event, such as
the Olympics or the World Cup, will benefit the economy or improve their political prospects
(Zimbalist, 2020). The second reason is to enhance the social status of the country itself, hoping
that the internationally broadcasted event will bring fame and relevance (Alegi, 2008). In many
cases, the result is similar to American outcomes, in that the purported benefits fall far short of
expectations. In some countries, the outcomes range from directly harmful to outright
catastrophic.
Stadiums built to elevate a country’s social status may achieve this goal, but many side
effects of these investments have been detrimental. The prodigious Cape Town Stadium in South
Africa cost $600 million to construct, and yet the stadium is rarely used since the 2010 World
Cup and has even seen calls for its demolition (Alegi, 2008). During the process, 70,000
construction workers went on strike in 2009 after being paid negligible wages for their work, and
human remains were found on site (Stadium Database, 2020). For the 2014 World Cup in Brazil,
eight workers died in a fire during construction, several structures collapsed, crew destroyed
rainforest and thousands of families in Rio de Janeiro’s slums were cleared out to accommodate
stadium land (Powell, 2016). The $220 million dollar stadium is now a white elephant, situated
in a city where one-quarter of its inhabitants are extremely poor and lack running water.
The most catastrophic example of stadium construction is seen in the upcoming 2022
World Cup in Qatar. Eager to show off Qatari progress, the nation is building an entire city for
the occasion, with a cost estimated at $45 billion. Not to mention the staggering cost, migrants
from Bangladesh, India and Nepal working on various stadiums’ refurbishment are exploited or
even subjected to forced labor, unable to change jobs, leave the country or receive timely
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compensation (Amnesty International, 2020). Over 6,500 of these workers have passed away, or
an average of 12 migrant workers per week since Qatar won their bid in 2010.
These international examples reinforce the perils of stadium construction, ranging from
the burden of the taxpayer to severe human rights violations. The rewards for these projects are
so high that interests are willing to neglect the huge costs that accrue in the background. If large
groups coordinated to avoid these outcomes, whether through protests or through coordinated
voter efforts, then these outcomes would potentially become sparser. However, there have been
sparse examples of citizen groups or other activism impeding these processes, so as long as this
enterprise remains profitable and incentive-laden, the phenomenon is likely to stick around for
quite some time.
This thesis focuses mainly on the economics and politics of stadium construction, but
there are several avenues for further research. One major topic that necessitates further research
is the environmental impact of sports stadiums. Stadium construction utilizes huge amounts of
resources, much of which could be redirected towards environmental efforts, affordable housing
or other projects that would more directly benefit these cities. Stadiums also create traffic jams in
many areas, and the negative externalities of air pollution and congestion are direct consequences
of stadium construction. Another topic that has barely any coverage in the literature is the health
and safety of construction workers when building sports stadiums. In 2020, two workers died in
a six-week span at the new SoFi Stadium in Los Angeles (Fenno, 2020). Many other workers
have suffered life-altering injuries over the course of these construction projects, with most due
to blatant code violations and construction mishaps. During the COVID-19 pandemic, an
estimated 25 construction workers at SoFi stadium were infected with the virus (Duarte, 2020).
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Whether these problematic outcomes are consistent with normal construction projects or
exacerbated by the high-demand timeline of sports stadiums is worth consideration.
The Yankees and the Raiders case studies offer nuanced examinations of stadium
construction, but this discussion highlights how these themes apply both domestically and
internationally. American politicians and team owners often exaggerate benefits to their
constituents, with the final outcome delivering less than promised. International examples not
only build on these themes but have even reflected the severe human rights violations associated
with stadium construction. And yet, the intangible benefits in each instance never measure up to
the associated costs. Simply put, stadium construction is an issue in which the outcomes always
underperform the promises.
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Conclusion
As the Raiders, Yankees and various other cases have shown, stadium construction is a
product of an imbalanced power struggle. The concentrated gainers of stadium construction,
which includes stakeholders such as team owners and politicians, far outweigh the dispersed and
relatively insignificant citizen groups. Gainers have strong incentive to invest in consultants or
lobbyists to push forward their agenda, as doing so can reap great economic rewards in the
future. Citizen groups against public subsidization have attempted to end public funding for these
projects, but they the lack the political clout and well-organized nature of the gainers. Having a
requisite number of citizens signing off on a petition may lead to a referendum on the issue, but
powerful interest groups outspend public action groups significantly to defeat these ballot
measures (Coates & Humphreys, 2003). By the time it is clear that a subsidy was a bad idea –
assuming that constituents even notice – the officials who approved the deal have long left
office.
Despite these powerful and organized gainers, there has been moderate success in
curbing teams from securing public dollars. Miami politicians, worried that they would lose their
basketball team after threats to leave the city, capitulated and promised $165 million of taxpayer
dollars to replace their eight-year-old stadium (Bernstein, 1998). Only after a large-scale public
protest were politicians dissuaded from shelling over millions, and they rescinded their offer. In
recent years, citizen groups in cities like Austin and Seattle have collectively organized and
garnered enough signatures to introduce the issue in city-wide elections. In Austin, over 26,000
voters – the required number to introduce a piece of legislation to the city council – signed a
petition to prevent public funding for the new Austin FC stadium. Seattle citizens created a group
called “Citizens Against Sports Stadium Subsidies,” in which they filed a petition to have a
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referendum overturning the Metropolitan King County Council’s decision to send $135 million
in public funds toward the Mariners ballpark. There have also been referenda in Cleveland,
Pittsburgh, Columbus, San Antonio, St. Paul, Scottsdale and more. Collective action problems
are omnipresent in obtaining signatures and rolling out plans to prevent public funding, but
Miami, Seattle, Austin and the other cities show that it is not out of the realm of possibility.
Citizens have avenues for change in this area, but organizing against the powerful
coalition of politicians and business interests has proved nearly impossible. Using the very same
examples as above, one can see that citizen activism has not actually led to better outcomes. The
Miami Heat paid for private construction of their stadium, but the upkeep is on the public. The
stadium sits on $38 million of county land and is in operation due to $64 million in public
subsidies (Garcia-Roberts, 2010). Austin’s Proposition A, which asked voters if they want the
right to vote before the city sells or leases any city-owned property for a non-public sports or
entertainment venue, failed by an overwhelming 62.9% to 37.1% (Neely, 2019). In Seattle, the
original backers withdrew the petition from consideration only a week after introducing the idea,
and members of the group offered no reason for their decision. King County Councilmembers
posited that these citizen groups did not have enough resources to obtain signatures or hire a firm
to carry out the process for them. Cleveland, Pittsburgh and the other remaining cities all had
protracted affairs that eventually fizzled.
Due to the large revenue streams generated by new or renovated sports facilities, teams
have considerable incentive to sway public opinion toward their side in these votes. Local
politicians also stand to gain from the granting of these subsidies, in terms of political capital and
visible accomplishments in the community (Coates & Humphreys, 2003). Citizen groups cannot
rival the amount of influence of these two groups and have subsequently struggled to halt public
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funding for these projects. However, there have been some glimmers of hope for stadium
detractors in recent years. In 2016, San Diego voters rejected Measure C, a proposal that would
have increased the city’s hotel occupancy tax by an additional 6 percent to fund the construction
of a city-owned stadium (Ballotpedia, 2016). After this ballot measure failed, the San Diego
Chargers, unable to receive public funding, relocated to Los Angeles. Those against public
funding for stadium construction achieved a rare win, despite stadium proponents and the
Chargers outspending their opponents by millions of dollars (Garrick, 2016). It is possible that
San Diego is the exception to the norm of stadium construction, but San Diego voters’ ability to
fight back against powerful interest groups shows that change in this area is possible.
There are many avenues for further research in the field of stadium construction that do
not involve the already large literature of cost-benefit analyses. A compelling study would
analyze why public action groups have largely failed to halt public funding and suggest potential
solutions to this problem. The present study is the first to view stadium construction through a
client politics lens, so additional studies expanding the scope of client politics to stadium
construction would build upon my study. Additionally, more specific studies on fans’ valuation
of sports teams on a city-to-city basis would be extremely helpful for the literature. Fans in
Boston or Chicago may value their teams more highly than Phoenix or Orlando, and
subsequently assign a higher willingness to pay to keep their team. If a study uncovered these
trends, then one could determine the fair price for what constituents are willing to pay and aim to
reform public subsidization to match these figures.
My thesis aims to further illustrate the pervasive problem of stadium construction, and
the various machinations used to place the burden on the taxpayer. These results reinforce the
idea that not only is stadium construction a bad deal for the taxpayer, but that the process is
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harmful in other, non-financial areas. My research also highlights the nuances of this issue and
the various actions of interested parties to achieve what they want, and how these often-subtle
actions have negative consequences. As long as the monopolistic structure of these leagues
persist, fans maintain their interest for their teams and the valuation of teams increase, these
trends are likely to persist for years to come.
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